A social choice correspondence (SCC) is virtually implementable if it is "-close (in the probability simplex) to some (exactly) implementable correspondence. Abreu and Sen (1991) proved that, without restriction on the set of alternatives receiving strictly positive probability at equilibrium, every SCC is virtually implementable in Nash Equilibrium. We study virtual implementation when the supports of equilibrium lotteries are restricted. We provide a necessary and suf…cient condition, imposing joint restrictions on SCCs and admissible supports. Then, we discuss how to construct supports. Finally, we study virtual implementation when the support is restricted to the e¢ cient or individually rational alternatives.
Introduction
The two key concepts of Nash implementation are those of a social choice correspondence and a mechanism. A social choice correspondence (henceforth an SCC) associates each state of the world (that is, typically, each pro…le of individual preferences) with a set of selected alternatives, which may be considered as what a benevolent planner views as optimal for society. A mechanism (or, game form) speci…es the list of strategies available to each individual agent, and an outcome function associating each list of individual strategies with an outcome, that is, a social alternative. An SCC is said to be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism such that, in each state of the world, the set of selected alternatives coincides with the set of outcomes which are supported by a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
In a seminal paper, Maskin (1997, published in 1999) identi…ed a necessary and almost su¢ cient condition for Nash implementation, which he called monotonicity. In spite of this breakthrough, the news was bad: monotonicity imposes severe restrictions on the class of Nash implementable SCCs. Many SCCs of interest fail to satisfy it. To list just a few, the Walrasian and the egalitarian-equivalent correspondences, the plurality and any other voting rules based on scoring functions do not satisfy monotonicity.
How restrictive monotonicity can be is illustrated by the following example. There are two agents 1 and 2; social alternatives a; b; c and d, and two states of the world and : Preferences of agents over the alternatives in the di¤erent states are described in the table below, which reads: in state ; agent 1 strictly prefers a to b to c to d; etc. Let us consider the SCC f de…ned as follows: f ( ) = fbg and f ( ) = fag : It cannot be Nash implemented. Suppose, indeed, that there is a mechanism where alternative b is supported by a Nash equilibrium at : by deviating, agent 1 cannot obtain any better alternative than b: But the alternatives which are worse than b at remain worse at : Consequently, the same pro…le of strategies keeps the Nash stability property at ; whereas b is no longer viewed as a desirable alternative.
This example can also be described as follows: the only di¤erence in preferences between and is agent 2 0 s preference reversal between alternatives a and c: It is, consequently, the only information the planner needs, to know whether b or a must be selected. But this information cannot be revealed if the requirement is that b be supported by a Nash equilibrium at :
A way out of the limitations imposed by monotonicity was proposed by Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991) under the name of virtual implementation. It consists of allowing the outcome of the mechanism to be a lottery on the social alternatives, and requiring that the alternatives selected by the SCC come out with a probability arbitrarily large but possibly smaller than 1.
What makes virtual implementation so powerful is that, in equilibrium, every alternative receives positive probability. Let us come back to the above example. At the Nash equilibrium supporting b with an arbitrarily large probability, alternatives a; c and d receive some strictly positive probability. If the mechanism is constructed in such a way that, by deviating, agent 2 can slightly increase the probability of a at the expense of c; then this agent will not deviate in state ; whereas he would in state ; and b-with arbitrarily large probability-is no longer supported as an equilibrium, the desired outcome.
The virtual Nash implementation approach may seem to be the solution to the implementation problem, but we would like to point out the following issue. Any alternative can now be the outcome of the game, as it receives a strictly positive probability in the equilibrium lottery. However, these alternatives may be arbitrarily ine¢ cient, unfair, or, in any meaningful sense, far from the selected alternative. We ask the following question. What happens if one restricts the class of mechanisms that can be used and imposes that the support of equilibrium lotteries belong to some admissible subset of the set of alternatives? Let us look back at the example. There is one and only one ine¢ cient alternative, c: What would happen if we wish to remove it from the set of alternatives likely to become the outcome of the game? Also, what if we want to minimize the set of alternatives which receive a strictly positive probability at equilibrium?
The example illustrates the two main lessons we will reach in this paper. First, it may turn out to be impossible to remove some undesirable alternatives from the set of alternatives which may end up being selected. In the example, indeed, it is impossible to remove c from the equilibrium lottery. Because the only preference reversal when going from to occurs between c and a with c preferred to a at ; the mechanism must provide the opportunity to agent 2 to decrease the probability of a at the expense of c; and this requires that c receives some strictly positive probability at equilibrium.
The second lesson is that admissible supports may indeed be very narrow. Let us look at the following mechanism implementing f; where b c ; for instance, means that the outcome is b with probability 1 " and c with probability " (for some arbitrarily small positive "): Agent 1, whose preferences don't change, announces if 2 announces ; and in the other case. Agent 2 has now a dominant strategy to announce the true state. This shows that very few additional alternative need to be added. In particular, only c needs to be given strictly positive probability at equilibrium, and only when the state of the world is :
These two lessons will follow from our main formal result. It consists of the de…nition of a property, called extended monotonicity, which we prove to be necessary and su¢ cient for virtual implementation of an SCC with an admissible support. It therefore imposes joint restriction on the SCC and the support.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the basic de…nitions. We introduce the property of extended monotonicity and give the main result in Section 3, where we also provide some examples of SCCs and their supports. In Section 4, we discuss how to construct supports and minimal supports, and we highlight a di¢ culty. In Section 5, we give other examples showing that restricting the support to the set of e¢ cient or individually rational alternatives may not be su¢ cient, thereby proving that undesirable alternatives may need to be inserted in the admissible support. We give concluding remarks in Section 6.
The set-up
We will develop our basic result under the assumptions that there are at least three agents, the number of social alternatives is …nite and preferences over alternatives are strict. None of these assumptions are necessary, and we explain at the end of Section 3 how the result generalizes.
There is a …nite set of agents N = f1; :::; ng, n 3 and a …nite set of alternatives A = f1; :::; mg. The set of admissible preference pro…les over A is denoted by . For any 2 ; i 2 N , i's weak preferences are represented by the ordering R i ( ). We denote by P i ( ) and I i ( ) the associated strict preference and indi¤erence relations, respectively. We assume that preferences are strict, that is, for each 2 ; each a; b 2 A and each i 2 N ,
De…ne by LC i ( ; a) = fb 2 A : a R i ( ) bg, the lower contour set of agent i 2 N at pro…le 2 and alternative a 2 A.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) f : A associates to each preference pro…le a non-empty subset of social alternatives.
Our problem is to implement SCCs. As it is well known after Maskin's (1977 Maskin's ( , 1999 ) seminal paper, the following monotonicity property is necessary for implementation in Nash equilibrium. It requires that an enlargement of any agent's lower contour set at a selected alternative do not remove this alternative from the selection.
De…nition 1 An SCC f satis…es monotonicity if and only if for all ; 2 and all a 2 f ( ),
Monotonicity is also su¢ cient for Nash implementation, when it is complemented with the requirement, called no-veto power, that an alternative which is top ranked by all but one agents must be selected by the SCC.
A lot of SCCs of interest fail to satisfy monotonicity and, therefore, to be Nash implementable. It is therefore necessary to modify the implementation requirement. The idea of virtual implementation is to allow outcomes to be lotteries over alternatives, and to simply require that the desired alternative receive an arbitrarily large but strictly lower than 1 probability of being selected. Furthermore, the idea of virtual implementation with an admissible support is to restrict the set of alternatives which receive a strictly positive probability at the equilibrium lottery. We therefore need to introduce the following notations and terminology.
Let us begin with our central concept. An admissible support h for an SCC f is a correspondence de…ned for each 2 and each a 2 f ( ) and satisfying the property that a h ( ; a) A. It represents the set of alternatives to which the mechanism designer agrees to give positive probability at equilibrium. Let us emphasize that the admissible support is allowed to depend on the targeted alternative. This possibility is not used, however, if, for instance, all e¢ cient alternatives are admissible. But the formulation we adopt is more general and allows us to de…ne the admissible support, for instance, like the set of alternatives in a neighborhood of the targeted alternative.
Let L = m 1 denote the set of lotteries over elements of A. In lottery`= (`a) a2A 2 L alternative a occurs with probability`a. With a slight abuse of notation, we write a both for the alternative a 2 A and the lottery`2 L such that`a = 1. The support of`2 L; denoted supp`, is the set of alternatives receiving a strictly positive probability in`: supp`= fa 2 A j`a > 0g :
We now need to consider that agents have preferences over lotteries. The set of admissible preference pro…les over L is . For any 2 ; i 2 N , R i ( ); P i ( ) and I i ( ) denote weak preference, strict preference and indi¤er-ence relations over lotteries. Given 2 , two elements and of are said to be elements of the set ( ) if they are consistent with the same preferences over elements of A. We assume that preferences over lotteries are monotonic in probabilities, that is, shifts in probabilities to strictly preferred alternatives yield strictly preferred lotteries. Formally, for any i 2 N; k 2 f1; : : : ; mg, let p ik : ! A be de…ned by
that is, p i1 ( ) is the preferred alternative of agent i in state ; p i2 ( ) her second preferred, etc. Then, for all 2 ( ), if two lotteries` (`a) a2A and 0 (`0 a ) a2A are such that for each k 2 f1; : : : ; mg,
then`R i ( )`0 and`P i ( )`0 if one inequality is strict. Let us note that this assumption is much weaker than that of expected utility. A mechanism (or game form) is a pair G = (S; g) with S = Q i S i , where S i the strategy space of agent i 2 N , and g : S ! L is the outcome function that associates a lottery to every pro…le of strategies. A typical strategy pro…le is s = (s i ) i2N 2 S. A game for G is a pair (G; ) for some 2 : Denote the set of Nash equilibria of game (G; ) by N E (G; ).
A mechanism G = (S; g) is ordinal if the set of Nash equilibria only depends on agents'preferences over pure alternatives, that is, for each 2 , each s 2 S and all ; 2 ( ), N E (G; ) = N E (G; ). For the sake of simplicity, we con…ne our attention to ordinal mechanisms. 1 Abusing notation, we sometimes let N E (G; ) denote the Nash equilibria of game (G; ) ; for any 2 ( ).
Rather than implementing an SCC itself, we will implement a lottery correspondence that is close to it. A lottery correspondence f`: L associates to each preference pro…le a non-empty subset of lotteries. A lottery correspondence f`is (ordinally) Nash implementable if there exists an ordinal mechanism G = (S; g) such that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of each game coincides with the selection of f`; that is, for all 2 ; f`
An SCC f is virtually Nash implementable with admissible support h if for all " > 0, there exists a Nash implementable lottery correspondence f" that is " close to f; with associated for each 2 ; and such that for each 2 , each a 2 f ( ) : supp (a) h ( ; a).
A necessary and su¢ cient condition
Characterizing the class of SCCs and supports which are compatible with virtual implementation turns out to be surprisingly simple. The required property is just an extension of monotonicity: It requires that an enlargement of any agent's lower contour set at a selected alternative or at any alternative receiving a strictly positive probability when the former alternative is implemented does not remove this alternative from the selection and does not remove any of the latter alternatives from the admissible support.
De…nition 2 An SCC f satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to an admissible support h if and only if there exists H, such that for all 2 , all a 2 f ( ), a H( ; a) h( ; a) and for all ; 2 , all a 2 f ( ), and all i 2 N ,
Correspondence H gathers all the alternatives which do receive a strictly positive probability: it may therefore not always coincide with h: We are now ready to state the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1 An SCC f is virtually implementable with admissible support h if and only if f satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to h.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. Let us note that if there is no restriction on the admissible support (that is, for all 2 and all a 2 f ( ), h( ; a) = A) then extended monotonicity is trivially satis…ed by any SCC, as an enlargement of the lower contour set at each and every alternative means that preferences do not change. We are then back to the Abreu-Sen result. If, at the other extreme, the support is restricted to be composed of the selected alternative only (that is, for all 2 and all a 2 f ( ), h( ; a) = a), then extended monotonicity boils down to monotonicity. In such a case, notice that allowing us to use lotteries out of equilibrium does not increase the class of implementable SCCs, except that we can get rid of no-veto power. 2 Let us now review how the above result generalizes when some of the assumptions we made are dropped.
If the number of agents is restricted to 2, then, the di¢ culty is exactly the same as for virtual Nash implementation. Extended monotonicity complemented with the non-empty lower contour intersection property as in Abreu and Sen (1991) is su¢ cient.
If preferences are not strict, then restrictions on the domain of preferences are needed. Our proofs in the appendix work, for instance, if we assume that each agent has a uniquely best alternative. Alternatively, we could use that there are pairs of alternatives such that for all preferences in the domain, the …rst alternative is always strictly preferred to the second one. Those conditions are trivially satis…ed in all economic environments under the assumption of strictly monotonic preferences.
If the number of alternatives is countable but not necessarily …nite, then our result generalizes, provided the same adjustment as the one proposed by Abreu and Sen is made. It consists in ordering the alternatives and assigning them a decreasing sequence of probabilities which sum up to ": If the number of alternatives is uncountable but preferences are continuous on a Euclidean space, then, again, the same adjustment as the one proposed by Abreu and Sen can be used: it consists of using a dense and countable subset of the alternatives and applying the same method as in the countable case.
Let us now exemplify these facts.
Example 1
The plurality correspondence.
The plurality correspondence selects all alternatives which appear most frequently at the top of the agents'rankings. Let us introduce the following rank function. For all a 2 A; i 2 N; 2 ; the rank of a in the preference of i at is the number of alternatives which i deems at least as good as a :
The plurality score of a at ; s (a; ) is the number of agents who rank a …rst:
The plurality correspondence is de…ned by
The plurality correspondence is not monotonic. It is even not subgame perfect implementable (see Abreu and Sen (1990) ). 3 Let us assume that preferences are strict, and let us consider a 2 P ( )nP ( ): Then, in the admissible support at h (a; ) there needs to be an alternative b which is involved in a preference reversal from to : bR i ( )c and cP i ( )b: This alternative may be di¤erent from a (otherwise P would satisfy monotonicity) but must necessarily be top ranked at (otherwise, s (b; ) = s (b; ) so that P ( ) = P ( )): Let T ( ) denote the set of alternatives which are top ranked by at least one agent:
T ( ) = fa 2 A : s (a; ) 1g :
We have thus shown the following: If preferences are strict, the plurality correspondence P satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to the top correspondence T .
One remarkable consequence of this fact is that when all agents prefer the same alternative, then it is the only alternative in the admissible support, so that the mechanism assigns it a probability of 1.
Example 2 The Walrasian correspondence
We need …rst to give a precise de…nition of A and : There are L goods and is composed of all preferences, de…ned over R L + ; which are continuous, strongly monotone and convex. The endowment of agent i 2 N is ! i > 0; and ! = P i2N ! i 0. 4 The set of alternatives, or feasible allocations is,
The Walrasian correspondence W is de…ned as follows. For 2 ; W ( ) is composed of all allocations a such that a i maximizes R i ( ) over the budget hyperplane
The Walrasian correspondence is known to violate monotonicity when is not restricted in such a way that Walrasian allocations are all interior to A: It is even not implementable in any game-theoretical solution concept when preferences are not di¤erentiable (see, e.g., Bochet (2005b) The only case where W fails to satisfy monotonicity is when W ( ) 3 a 2 AnintA; LC i ( ; a) LC i ( ; a) for each i 2 N; whereas a = 2 W ( ) as illustrated in a two-agent-two-good economy in Figure 1 , where only the preferences of agent 1 change. By continuity of preferences, there exists b 2 H W ( ; a) and c 2 A such that,
which is su¢ cient to guarantee virtual implementation of W:
4 Our conventions for vector inequalities are , > and .
We have thus shown the following: If preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic, convex and di¤erentiable, the Walrasian correspondence satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to H W : The above example shows how to save on the size of the support: as long as we know that the selected allocation remains selected after monotonic transformations of preferences, it is not necessary to provide opportunities to reveal preference reversal and the support can be minimal. On the contrary, when the Walrasian allocation is on the boundary of the feasible set, one needs a larger support.
Example 3 The egalitarian equivalent correspondence
In the same model as above (except that we now disregard individual endowments to view ! as a social endowment), an allocation a 2 A is egalitarian-equivalent if there exists a reference bundle a 0 ( ; a) ! such that each agent is indi¤erent between what she gets and this reference bundle, that is, for all i 2 N , a i I i ( )a 0 ( ; a) (see Pazner and Schmeidler (1974)). The egalitarian equivalent correspondence EQ :
A associates to each economy 2 , its set of egalitarian-equivalent allocations EQ( ). This correspondence is not monotonic (cfr Thomson (1999) ). On the other hand, it is subgame perfect implementable (cfr Demange (1994) and Maniquet (2002) ). Let us show that it can be virtually implemented with a small support: each support must contain no more than n + 1 allocations. Let
; that is, each support is composed of the desired allocation together with allocations where each agent precisely gets the reference bundle (and the other agents get an equal share of the remaining resources).
We have: If preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic, and convex, the egalitarian equivalent correspondence satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to H EQ : Indeed, let us consider 2 and a 2 EQ ( ) with corresponding a 0 . Let 6 = : If a = 2 EQ ( ) ; then for at least one agent it is no longer true that a i I i ( )a 0 and we have a preference reversal between a i and a 0 (note that the reversal can go either way). If a 2 EQ ( ) ; then either the reference bundle is the same, in which case H EQ ( ; a) = H EQ ( ; a) ; or it is di¤erent, in which case we have again at least one preference reversal between some a i and a 0 :
Interestingly, the game form proposed by Demange (1994) to implement egalitarian equivalent allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium has n + 1 stages, and out of equilibrium allocations are similar to the ones we need to have in the admissible support.
Example 4 The e¢ cient and egalitarian equivalent correspondence
Under our assumptions on preferences, e¢ cient egalitarian equivalent allocations always exist and the e¢ cient correspondence (selecting all e¢ cient allocations) satis…es monotonicity. One may therefore wonder whether the result above can be used to construct the support which would allow us to virtually implement the e¢ cient and egalitarian equivalent correspondence.
Actually, if a SCC f 1 satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to h 1 ; and another SCC f 2 satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to h 2 ; then if the SCC f 1 \f 2 is non-empty, it satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to h 1 [h 2 : Indeed, as h 1 contains all the alternatives necessary to reveal a preference reversal indicating that an alternative is no longer in f 1 ; and h 2 does the same for f 2 ; combining h 1 and h 2 also gives a su¢ cient support. Given that the e¢ cient correspondence satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to the trivial support h (a; ) = a (by monotonicity), we have: If preferences are continuous, strongly monotonic, and convex, the e¢ cient and egalitarian equivalent correspondence satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to H EQ :
Constructing the supports
The result presented in the previous section can be used to answer two questions: …rst, given a SCC, which admissible supports would allow us to implement it; second, given some admissible support, which SCCs can be implemented with this support. We answer the former question in this section, and leave the latter for the next section. Let us rewrite extended monotonicity in the following way. Part 1 of the above de…nition illustrates the speci…city of virtual Nash implementation compared to other notions of implementation. The key problem of implementation is to give agents the opportunity to reveal preference reversals in such a way that alternatives which are no longer selected by the SCC after the reversal (like alternative a in the de…nition) are no longer supported by an equilibrium. For any such reversal, like the one involving b and c in the condition, it is su¢ cient to add b to the admissible support. The possibility to decrease the probability assigned to b and to increase the probability assigned to c is just what is needed for the mechanism designer to know whether a should be selected or not. That is what makes virtual implementation so easy and successful. The lesson to draw from this part of the de…nition is that only one alternative needs to be added to the support (that is, needs to receive strictly positive probability at equilibrium) for each pair of preference pro…les.
Let us apply this idea to identify the minimal support necessary to virtually implement an arbitrary f in the case of a …nite . Let > be an order on A: Let 2 and a 2 f ( ) : For each 2 such that a = 2 f ( ) ; identify the pair (b ; c ) such that for some i 2 N; b R i ( ) c and c P i ( ) b and no other preference reversal involving a b higher in the order on A exists. Then h ( ; a) [ 2 ;a = 2f ( ) b : A minimal support must contain at least those elements. 5 Part 2 of the de…nition illustrates the trade-o¤ one faces when constructing support. Indeed, if there were no two pro…les selecting the same alternative (that is, no ; 2 such that a 2 f ( ) \ f ( )), then the support could be constructed as described above. But as soon as an alternative is in the selection at several pro…les, a choice has to be made. The …rst option is to add an alternative to the support, so that the relevant preference reversal is revealed and the designer is able to distinguish between pro…les and : But it is also possible to save on the number of alternatives in the support. It is indeed what part 2) b) of the de…nition tells us: there is no need to reveal a preference reversal from to as there is nothing wrong if alternative a is still supported by the same equilibrium at as at ; provided all the alternatives which receive positive probability at the equilibrium supporting a are still admissible at : We highlight next the di¢ culties and the choices that have to be made in constructing the supports.
In the construction of minimal support we begun above, de…ning h ( ; a) [ 2 ;a = 2f ( ) b may, indeed, not be su¢ cient. Let ; ; ' 2 be de…ned as follows:
Let f be de…ned by f ( ) = f ( ) = fag ; f (') = fcg : Let us assume that the order is a > b > c > d > e: We must have a; b 2 h ( ; a) ; as b R 2 ( ) c and c P 2 (') b is the only reversal between and ': Also, a 2 h ( ; a) and c 2 h ('; c) : If h is not larger than that, we face the following di¢ culty: the equilibrium strategy pro…le supporting a at cannot but be also an equilibrium strategy pro…le at (there are no preferences reversal involving a or b between and ); whereas b is not admissible at : Therefore, either we impose b 2 h ( ; a) ; and the same strategy pro…le may be an equilibrium at as at ; or we impose c 2 h ( ; a) ; so that the reversal c R 2 ( ) d and d P 2 ( ) c is used to break the undesired equilibrium at : This illustrates the di¤erent possible strategy to construct admissible supports. It also shows that minimal supports are not unique, and, more importantly, that there is no single algorithm to construct them.
Fixing the support
The second question about virtual implementation with admissible support is the following one: assuming that an admissible support has been chosen, which SCCs can be virtually implemented with that support. We …nd the question particularly relevant if the admissible support is either the set of e¢ cient or individually rational (that is, Pareto dominating a status quo) alternatives. Our main result in this section is the observation that both the e¢ cient and the individually rational correspondences are invariant with respect to extended monotonic transformations, that is, if is obtained from by a monotonic transformation of the preferences at each and every e¢ -cient (resp., individually rational) alternative, then the set of e¢ cient (resp., individually rational) alternatives is the same at as at : As we show below, this considerably simpli…es the condition an SCC must satisfy to be virtually implementable with e¢ cient or individually rational support. We then give examples.
Let us begin by formally de…ning the e¢ cient and individually rational (with respect to some status quo c 2 A) correspondences respectively. For each 2 ;
For each 2 , and for some c 2 A;
Theorem 2
The P E and IR c correspondences are invariant with respect to extended monotonic transformations, that is, for all ; 2 ;
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The consequence of Theorem 2 is the following. In order to check whether an SCC is virtually implementable with admissible support P E or IR, we need only check Part 1) of de…nition 3, that is, that all selected alternatives are still selected after a change in preferences which extends the lower contour sets at each Pareto e¢ cient (resp. individually rational) alternatives. Formally, we have the following de…nition.
De…nition 4 An SCC f satis…es PE (resp. IR)-extended monotonicity if and only if, for all ; 2 ,
Example 5 The Plurality correspondence and other scoring correspondences
Given that the top correspondence is a subcorrespondence of the e¢ cient correspondence, example 1 above shows that the Plurality correspondence can be virtually implemented with e¢ cient support (it does not make sense to check whether or not it can be virtually implemented with individually rational support as the plurality correspondence is not a subcorrespondence of the individually rational correspondence). We raise the question whether other scoring correspondences, that is, correspondences based on the maximization of the overall score of an alternative are virtually implementable with e¢ cient support. Let us recall that Vartiainen (2003) shows that no scoring rule can be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium. Sjöström (1993) shows that the Borda rule is not implementable in trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Here also, the answer is negative.
Let 2 R jAj + be a weight vector, such that 1 = 1 2 : : : jAj = 0: Given ; the score of a at is equal to
The scoring correspondence S associated to is de…ned by S ( ) = fa 2 A j s (a; ) s (b; ) ; 8b 2 Ag :
Let us note that if 2 = 0; S is the plurality correspondence, if jAj 1 = 1; S is the anti-plurality correspondence, and if k = 1
; then S is the Borda correspondence. Let us assume that S 6 = P; that is, 2 > 0: Then there exist two integers n 1 ; n 2 ; such that n 2 > n 1 and n 2 n 1 n 2 < 2 : Let 2 be described as below, that is, n 1 agents have preferences a P i ( ) b P i ( ) : : : P i ( ) c; etc. We have s (a; ) = n 1 + 2 n 2 > s (c; ) = n 2 ;
and, clearly, s (a; ) > s (b; ) for all b 6 = a; c: Therefore, S ( ) = fag : Now, P E ( ) = fa; cg : Let 2 be described as in the table, that is, is obtained from by an extended monotonic transformation at each alternative in P E ( ) : By PE-extended monotonicity, we should have: fag 2 S ( ) ; whereas s (a; ) = n 1 + 2 n 2 < s (c; ) = n 2 + 2 n 1 ; the desired contradiction. Consequently, we have proven: the plurality correspondence is the only scoring correspondence satisfying PE-extended monotonicity.
This result con…rms the special status, among scoring correspondences, of the plurality correspondence, when one takes incentives into account. Indeed, Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava (1994) show that the plurality correspondence is boundedly implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium, though no other scoring rule is.
Example 6 The Walrasian correspondence
If the support is the set of e¢ cient allocations, can we solve the boundary problem? The answer is negative. Indeed, if the set of e¢ cient allocations is itself on the boundary, then an extended monotonic change in preferences from to may break the Walrasian property of an allocation without a¤ecting the set of e¢ cient allocations.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have characterized the set of pairs of SCCs and admissible supports such that the former can be virtually implemented with respect to the latter. Using this result, we have shown that admissible support su¢ cient to implement well-known correspondences may be surprisingly small, but we have also shown that undesirable allocations may have to belong to the support necessary to implement some SCCs.
Our conclusion is that, in spite of the Abreu and Sen general possibility result, virtual Nash implementation should not be viewed as the end of the story, and it would be interesting to explore which (especially small) supports can be used to implement well-known desirable SCCs.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
First part: if f is virtually implementable with admissible support h, then f satis…es extended monotonicity with respect to h.
Since f is virtually implemented with admissible support h, for all " > 0, there exist a Nash implementable lottery correspondence f" ; a bijection for each 2 ; and a mechanism G = (S; g) such that for all 2 , all a 2 f ( ); there exists s 2 S such that d(a; (a)) "; g (s) = (a) and s 2 N E (G; ). Let H be de…ned by: for all 2 , all a 2 f ( ); H ( ; a) =supp (a): As f is virtually implemented with admissible support h by G; H ( ; a) h ( ; a) : Let us …x some 2 and a 2 f ( ) : Let 2 be derived from ; a and H ( ; a) like in the de…nition of extended monotonicity. We need to prove that s 2 N E (G; ) : Since s 2 N E (G; ) ; for all 2 ( ) ; all i 2 N; all s These expansions imply that, in the probability simplex,
Therefore, We show that this game form implements the lottery correspondence f" de…ned by:`2 f" ( ) , 9a 2 f ( ) :`= (1 ")a + "~(H( ; a)):
Given that f" is "-close to f , this will prove the claim. The proof is divided in two steps.
Step 1: For all 2 ;`2 f" ( ) ; there exists s 2 N E (G; ) such that g (s ) =`and suppg (s ) h ; 1 (`) : Suppose the true pro…le is and a 2 f ( ). Each agent i 2 N announcing s i = ( ; a; c; b; 1)-for a arbitrary c 6 = b-is a Nash Equilibrium of G. By deviating to s 0 i 6 = s i , an agent i 2 N can only trigger rule 2, decrease the probability of an alternative b 2 H ( ; x) and increase the probability of a worse alternative c. Therefore, s 2 N E(G; ) and suppg (s ) = H ( ; a) h ( ; a) :
Step 2: For all 2 ; s 2 N E (G; ) ; g (s ) 2 f" ( ) and suppg (s ) h ; 1 (g (s )) : Suppose the true pro…le is 2 .
1)
There is no equilibria under rule 2a or 3. At any strategy pro…le under either rule 2 or 3, two di¤erent alternatives receive strictly positive probability (even if b i or c i = a): Under the assumption that there is a uniquely best alternative for each agent, the outcome lottery cannot be the preferred lottery of any agent. Some agents, therefore, can pro…tably deviate.
2) Assume s 2 N E (G; ) under rule 2b and for all j 6 = i : s j = ( ; a; :; :; :). By the same reasoning as above, that cannot happen if two alternatives or more get strictly positive probability. Therefore, g (s ) = a; so that H ( ; a) = fag : Any j 6 = i could have deviated under rule 3. Therefore, p j1 ( ) = a: Also, i does not deviate, so that LC i ( ; a) LC i ( ; a): Given that a 2 f ( ); by extended monotonicity, a 2 f ( ).
3) Assume s 2 N E (G; ) under rule 1 and for all i 2 N : s i = ( ; a; :; :; :). By announcing s 0i = 0i ; x 0i ; c 0i ; b 0i ; n 0i such that 6 = 0i ; c 0i 2 LC i ; b Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2 : Consider the P E correspondence. The argument runs in the same way for IR. Let 2 : Let 2 be such that for all b 2 P E( ); all i 2 N; LC i (b; ) LC i (b; ). Therefore, for all b; c 2 P E ( ) ; all i 2 N; b R i ( ) c , b R i ( ) c; whereas for all b 2 P E ( ) ; c 2 AnP E ( ) ; b R i ( ) c ) b R i ( ) c: Consequently, P E ( ) P E ( ) : Finally, if b 2 A n P E ( ) ; then there exists c 2 P E ( ) such that for all i 2 N; c R i ( ) b and c P j ( ) b for some j 2 N: Consequently, for all i 2 N; c R i ( ) b and c P j ( ) b so that b 2 A n P E ( ) :
Q.E.D.
